In Characters & Viewpoint, Orson Scott Card’s how-to for fiction, he writes extensively about the subjective dimension of characterization, what he calls “sympathy.” Writers use tools to make characters more or less likable to the reader, and these don’t necessarily have a lot to do with what makes a person good. For example, we tend to sympathise more with a character who suffers, even an evil jerk — which is why in fiction, evil jerks we’re supposed to tolerate are generally put through a lot of suffering. Pain and fear are hooks for empathy.
Does it make good moral sense? Not really. That Rudolf Hess suffered in Spandau prison doesn’t make him any more likable as a Nazi fuckhead. Nor does it make sense to assume an intellectual is a bad guy, though as Card points out, that’s the rule as often as not. The crux of sympathy is perceived likeness. People being people, they generally like a character if the character is like them. But where do we get our ideas about what we’re like?
I remember, when I was a child, watching cheesy box-office adventure movies and feeling desperately alienated from the heroes. By convention, these were mostly square-jawed football types whose distinguishing feature was a sort of moral “clarity” (i.e. simplicity). My sort of people – science-freaks, skeptics, liberals – were invariably sidekicks and jokes, misguided fools or finks for evil. I often suspect that this kind of cognitive dissonance, with its origin in normatizing fictions, is as much responsible for the appeal of the “gothic” subculture (and other deliberate affronts to popular morality) as anything else.
One of the purposes of The Sender, when I began writing, was to study television’s sympathy ploys and infer something of America’s emotional landscape. So what, then? Well, if we momentarily accept Card’s hypothesis about sympathy, we can guess that Americans still feel stupid; broad popular support for Homer Simpson attests to that. Moral simplicity also remains much-prized; cf. Marge Simpson, sure, but also Michael Bluth, Jack Bauer, John Locke, Buffy Summers, etc., all protagonists who face moral challenges by being conscientious and inflexible.
Card didn’t write about nihilistic irony; perhaps he never recognized it. I’d argue that comedies making heavy use of it tend to employ an inverted value structure. Curb Your Enthusiasm consists almost entirely of unsympathetic, unlikable people — we follow Larry David not because he’s particularly likable (though who can’t relate to faux pas?) but because his flaws are so much more spectacular than the others’.
The Office makes such an explicit hierarchy out of its sympathy claims that it’s often embarrasing. Young, white and clever are the top of the heap, privileged not only to viewers’ presumed sympathy but also their interest (we follow their personal lives without any humorous hook). Black and gay follow, privileged to viewers’ respect and called upon to add moral weight, but from a distance. Viewers are not asked to respect the elderly, the misfit or unattractive women — they’re mostly used for one-note jokes. For the boss and his sycophants, the show asks our occasional pity. Toward the conservative Christian, we are invited to feel mostly contempt.
Card makes a few questionable posits — for one, the tenor of his writing suggests that he believes these claims to be universal, a tedious and predictable assumption. He also seems to believe that the relationship between consumers’ attitudes and fiction is, for all intents and purposes, one-way. Kate Wright offers a more nuanced, if a thousandfold more disturbing, view in her Hollywood how-to Screenwriting Is Storytelling — but I’ll cover that another time.